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Abstract We aim to investigate the comparative effects of corruption and the second fundamental
law of capitalism as proposed by Thomas Piketty on the level of inequality in a nation. We hypothesize
that corruption, which can be viewed as an institutional distortion, has comparatively larger effects
on inequality than the Second Fundamental Law. Correcting for endogeneity using an instrument
variables approach, we find that corruption affects inequality in a non-linear fashion following a
concave function. Utilising a varying rate of return, we also find some evidence that r-g increases
inequality in the short run. This suggests pre-existing holders of capital will derive higher shares of
income even in the short run. However, the effect is not as strong as that of corruption and insignificant
in highly unequal countries. This suggests that, institutional factors play a more important role than
the second fundamental law of capitalism in the most unequal countries. Thus, institutional reforms
to curb corruption are as relevant as taxation of capital in combating inequality.
Keywords corruption · inequality · r-g · Piketty · second fundamental law of capitalism · gini
D63 E02 E22 O11
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Ishrat Jahan who kindly gave us time to proof read each of our drafts;
also to Aishwarya Rahman who helped us with inputting data. We would like to offer our sincerest
gratitude to the participants of the BRAC University Econometric Analysis Seminar who offered us
conversations, advice and constructive criticism.
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Adnan M S Fakir
BRAC University, 66 Mohakhali, Dhaka-1212
E-mail: adnanfakir@bracu.ac.bd; adnanfakir@gmail.com
K M Masnun Hosain
BRAC University, 66 Mohakhali, Dhaka-1212
E-mail: masnunhosain@gmail.com
Azraf Uddin Ahmad
BRAC University, 66 Mohakhali, Dhaka-1212
E-mail: azrafahmad@gmail.com
Mostafa Rafid Hossain
BRAC University, 66 Mohakhali, Dhaka-1212
E-mail: mostafa.hossain13@gmail.com
Ridhim Sadman Gani
BRAC University, 66 Mohakhali, Dhaka-1212
E-mail: ridhimsadman@gmail.com
Manuscript with Tables Click here to download Manuscript Manuscript.pdf 
2 Fakir, Ahmed, Hosain, Hossain & Gani (2016)
1 Introduction
Inequality has become a major topic of discussion in all countries as well as in economic circles since
the advent of the 2008 financial crisis. Discussions regarding the causes and the structure of inequal-
ity have dominated not only mainstream economics but also policy discussions. This discourse has
been driven by the rise of inequality in not only developed and industrialized economies but also in
the developing world, with concerns being expressed regarding the possible consequences. While it
is widely accepted that inequality brings greater social divides and can dampen economic demand
in the long run, it then becomes a question of how to best tackle it by understanding the structural
causes that drive it.
We posit in this paper that one of the chief determinants of inequality in any society is the level
of corruption prevalent in it. We argue that, by undermining the basic tools of redistributive policy
at every level, corruption creates an environment in which inequality is allowed to rise. In particular,
we postulate that because the nature of corruption varies with levels of inequality, corruption acts
on inequality non-linearly. Building on this premise, we consider recent developments in the field of
inequality by examining Piketty’s second fundamental law of capitalism. This is of particular interest
to us as the second fundamental law suggests that inequality is a general feature of capitalism. If the
second fundamental law holds, it suggests that the efficient functioning of capitalism is what drives
inequality, alongside distortive means such as corruption.
The objectives of the study can thus be precised into two arrangements:
1. To build on and further the existing literature by examining non-linear effects of corruption on
inequality using a panel of both developed and developing countries constructed from recent years,
2000 to 2014. We believe the non-linearity of corruption can shed more light on the seldom explored
differential effects of corruption as inequality increases.
2. To contribute to the literature by testing the validity of the second fundamental law of capitalism
and how it interacts with increasing levels of corruption, affecting inequality. Provided it holds
true, we aim to study the interaction of such a law with the institutional framework of a state. By
examining this relationship, we can establish a comparative to see if distortions such as corruption
drive inequality or whether the general features of capitalism make inequality inevitable.
1.1 Corruption & Inequality
The general literature on corruption points out to the negative effects on societal and macroeconomic
outcomes but there are disputes regarding the best ways of measuring the effects of corruption.
The widespread study of corruption has led to a pretty comprehensive understanding of the nature
and effects of corruption across widely diverse societies. Despite the various guises it takes, Rose-
Ackerman (1997) best describes corruption as the exchange of bribes when a public bureaucrat has
power over the distribution of a benefit or cost to a private entity. By their definition, it implies cor-
ruption as a consequence of the plethora of interactions made necessary due to the prevalence of the
modern mixed economy. They identify that corruption may happen as private entities may choose to
make an illegal payment to obtain undue government benefits, avoid a due cost or obtain a position
in government. This definition is important in highlighting the fact that corruption enables private
individuals to fundamentally alter the lawful distribution of public & private resources in ones favor
which eventually affects the income distribution.
Similarly Shleifer & Vishy (1993) identify corruption as the sale of public assets for personal gain
by public officials which implies that there might be significant private gains to be made from corrup-
tion. Furthermore, the unavailability of certain public services or assets due to corruption may also
reduce the social mobility of certain groups of people. We are more concerned with the first definition
of corruption given that we are looking into inequality. According to our argument, use of favours,
bribes or kickbacks in order to evade taxes is what drives inequality in the vast majority of developing
countries.
In comparison to these definitions of corruption, Kaufmann & Wei (1999) propose that corruption
may be thought of as grease money which eliminates bureaucratic hold-ups. This takes a more op-
Comparative Effect of Corruption and r − g on Inequality 3
timistic view of corruption which may be seen as improving efficiency, thus promoting growth. This
commonly held belief however does not hold up to analytic scrutiny as they find that bribe taking
increases the bureaucratic hassle that firms face, whilst also increasing the cost of raising capital in
most specifications of their model. Similarly, Mironov (2005) argues that corruption is uncorrelated
with governance characteristics and it contributes to positive GDP growth in countries with poor
institutions by enabling individuals to bypass bureaucratic bottlenecks. If this is indeed true, then
the ability to use corruption as means of bypassing these bottlenecks may enable certain entities to
derive higher incomes.
Regardless of how corruption is defined however, Shleifer & Vishy (1993) duly notes that it may
consist of a large share of a developing country’s GDP and consequently have significant distortionary
effects on the economy. Therefore, it is worth considering the sources of corruption as well as its effects
on various macroeconomic goals. Montinola & Jackman (2002) find that corruption does not increase
with government size which contradicts the popular argument that larger governments encourage
more corruption. However, given that Barreto (2001) & Mauro (1995) find that bureaucracy is a
significant explanatory factor of corruption, it implies that larger governments may not necessarily
lead to corruption as long as they do not increase levels of bureaucracy.
One of the seminal works into the effects of corruption has been that of Mauro (1995) which
looks into the effect of corruption on the economic growth of a country. Mauro finds that corruption
lowers investment which causes growth to decrease in his study of 58 countries (1971-79). He argues
that if Bangladesh were to raise its bureaucratic integrity to that of Uruguays standard, Bangladeshs
level of investment would rise by 5 per cent. Subsequent inquiries into the effects of corruption have
found results which support that corruption does indeed impede growth. Aidt (2009), Lash (2004)
and Swaleheen (2011) find similar results. However, the effects of corruption on inequality are often
disputed widely in literature.
Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme (2002) note that corruption is associated with higher levels of
inequality. They found corruption to have a large effect on inequality with the impacts being even
more pronounced for countries with abundant natural resources, often referred to as the natural
resource curse. This finding is consistent with that of Montinola and Jackman (2002) who report
corruption affecting OPEC countries significantly more than countries with lower natural resources.
On similar grounds, Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme (2002) also note that the effect of corruption is
more pronounced when consumption based Gini is used as opposed to income based Gini, with high
incomes being under-reported due to corruption and tax evasion.
Li, Xu & Zou (2000) establishes a quadratic relationship of corruption with inequality. They find
that high and low levels of corruption lead to low inequality whereas intermediate levels of corruption
lead to higher inequality levels. However, they only utilize a panel of 41 countries for the period
1980-1992 with 26 of the countries being developed. In contrast, our panel has a larger coverage of 78
countries with 39 developing countries. This is important given that the greatest incidence and effects
of corruption are present in developing nations. Moreover, the authors do not control for economic
growth which is an important factor in determining inequality. This non-linear nature of corruption
has also been reported on economic growth and other macroeconomic variables (Swaleheen, 2009).
Similarly, using empirical evidence, Gyimah-Brempong (2002) argues that corruption increases in-
come inequality by allowing the rich to avoid taxes and other financial duties in an African context.
The author notes that the effects of corruption are endemic in Africa with the most severe effects.
This suggests that there may be self-selection bias within the panel and the results are generally not
applicable for a wider set of countries. By utilizing a larger panel which includes developed countries
along with the developing, we overcome this particular problem. In addition, none of the above studies
actively control for institutional democracy which may act as check to inequality by giving citizens
more de-jure political power.
The difficulty regarding measuring the effect of corruption is the potential simultaneity it faces
with inequality; while corruption may aggravate inequality in a country, initial levels of inequality
itself may give rise to corruption. This endogeneity between inequality and corruption is best illus-
trated by Jong-Sung & Khagram (2005). Using instrument variables and 2SLS estimation to control
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for the simultaneity, they find that one standard deviation decrease in inequality increases freedom
from corruption by two-thirds standard deviations. Furthermore, Li, Xu & Zou (2000) argue that
corruption suffers from measurement error since it is such a broadly defined phenomenon.
This illustrates the need to solve for endogeneity in corruption, in order to obtain unbiased es-
timates. Mauro (1995) was one of the first papers to do this using ethno-linguistic fractionalization
(ELF) & colonial history as instruments of corruption. ELF may not have direct effects on growth, but
may point to ethnic splits causing higher levels of inequality directly. Similarly, in Gwiyah-Brempong
(2002), the author finds that ELF in conjunction with colonial settler mortality serve as strong in-
struments for corruption when investigating the effects of corruption on inequality. The study was
however, conducted exclusively in an African setting and it remains to be seen whether the instru-
ments hold their strength on a broader set of countries. Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme (2002) argue
that the length of exposure to democracy is a good instrument for corruption since it has significant
effects on corruption by introducing checks and balances to government conduct, citing Barro (1999)
who posited that democracy has no significant correlation on the level of corruption in society to
justify their use of this particular instrument.
Since the initial arrangement of our study concerns the non-linear effect of corruption on inequality,
we also use instrument variables to purge the estimation of reverse causality. However, our choice of
instruments differ from past studies, as we believe some of the past instruments to be unable to satisfy
the exclusion restriction criteria. Arguments for this are provided when we introduce our estimation
strategy under section 3.
1.2 Piketty’s Forces of Divergence
Inequality has come back as a major focus of economic discussion in the aftermath of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis. A large chunk of this discussion has centered upon Piketty (2014) and its proposed
mechanism of inequalitys propagation. Piketty motivates his discussion by showing how inequality
has returned to levels seen prior to the first world war, further elaborating that inequality is fun-
damentally the consequence of pre-existent owners of accumulated capital enjoying greater returns
which are not matched by increases in income. This is summarized by what Piketty refers to as the
fundamental force of divergence, summarized as r − g. He argues that as growth rates slowdown in
most of the world, inequality will increase and income from capital will make up increasing shares of
national income.
Piketty (2014) developed the r− g hypothesis on the basis of a standard growth model. The first
law he expressed is simply an accounting identity derived from the growth model, where the capital
share of national income = r × Ky , where r is the real return to capital. However, his second law is
far more substantial and consequently more controversial. Elaborating that, β = sg , where β is the
ratio of capital to total income, Piketty (2014) argues that this a long term equilibrium which the
economy tends towards if it saves a share, s, of its income and grows at a rate of g. Piketty combines
the two equations to form that the capital share of national income = r × sg .
As long as r is greater than g, the share of income going to capital will always increase. Piketty
argues that this allows holders of capital to enjoy increasingly larger returns to capital which prop-
agates inequality over the long term. This is summarized as the r − g hypothesis, which forms the
core of his second fundamental law of capitalism. Based on historical data, it is further argued that
periods of low growth contributed to periods of high inequality over the past 200 years.
This view of inequality has attracted significant criticism from the intellectual community for
some of the unconventional assumptions it makes regarding savings behavior. Krusell & Smith (2015)
argue that Pikettys assumption of constant net savings is particularly unrealistic, as this indicates
that as growth approaches zero it requires savings rate to approach 100 per cent which contradicts the
internal logic of Piketty’s work. However, Krusell & Smith (2015) concede that they do not explicitly
test the r− g hypothesis and indicate that it may have potentially divergent effects, although it may
be milder than the extent to which Piketty predicts. In light of this conclusion, we control for each
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nations gross savings rate in our estimations. Furthermore, Galbraith (2014) argues that r is not the
correct measure of capital income since it is taxed in most cases and hence may not contribute to
inequality as much as Piketty theorizes. Galbraith (2014) argues that after deducting taxes, ‘r’ may be
lower than‘g’ and hence not responsible for the increase in inequality we have seen. It is therefore nec-
essary to also control for taxation rates enabling us to isolate the effects of taxes on returns to capital.
Acemoglu & Robinson (2015) find no conclusive proof that r− g impacts inequality either for the
short or long run. They argue that Piketty’s findings are fundamentally flawed due to no allowance
being made for institutional structures, emphasizing on institutional changes being far more respon-
sible for the evolution of inequality over time. The authors further elaborate that focusing only on
top 1 per cent of incomes ignores what is happening more broadly with inequality. We thus use Gini
as a measure of inequality theorizing that Gini coefficients may give as broader look at society-wide
inequality and its movements.
As a response, Piketty (2015) notes that r − g is by no means the only determinant of inequality
and points out the role that historical changes in policy, attitudes and technology played in creating
inequality. The author further concedes that the interaction between r − g, institutions and public
policy is far more important in determining the level of inequality in society. We feel that it is necessary
to examine this interaction for it is yet to be explored in the available literature either in the short
or the long term.
2 Data
We sourced the vast majority of our macroeconomic data from the World Bank database. Net Gini
statistics are taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Data set compiled by Solt (2014).
Net Gini are a measure of income distribution after deduction of personal income tax. This data set
utilizes standardization and smoothing techniques to ensure greatest coverage and comparability. An
issue with the use of Gini is that it does not give any information regarding the structure of inequality
as it evolves over time. In comparison, Piketty (2014) uses top centile and decile income shares to
measure inequality. We choose to utilize Gini as the vast majority of especially developing nations in
our panel do not report top decile income shares, probably due to incomplete records. Additionally,
as Acemoglu & Robinson (2015) note that focusing exclusively on top decile shares obfuscates what
is happening with income distributions in the wider economy. Nevertheless, as a robustness check of
our findings, we report our model with top decile income shares under section 5.
The Corruptions Perception Index (CPI) is collated by Transparency International which uses
data from 12 different sources from 11 institutions to measure the perceptions of corruption in a
country. As such, CPI constitutes the largest cross country measure of corruption available for use.
Despite its widespread use, utilizing CPI as a measure for corruption has its share of criticisms. Aidt
(2009) finds that perceptions of corruption and experiences of corruption differ quite significantly, to
the extent that the author argues that CPI may be a poor measure of corruption. However, expe-
rience of corruption is likely to face ample under-reporting to the extent that it would bias results
considerably. In addition, the kind of tax evasion which substantially affects inequality is likely to
be virtually unreported in a corruption experience index. Since the vast majority of corruption is
hidden and unrecorded by its very nature, it is no exaggeration that a perfect measure does not exist.
However, in its stead, the perceived level of corruption captures the largest possible dimensions of
corruption.
Data on government effectiveness, regulatory quality and other governance indicators are obtained
from the World Governance Indicator Dataset from the World Bank Group. Democracy indicators
comes from the Polity IV data set where it measures the quality of the institutional democracy by
looking at various factors such as frequency of elections, constraints on executive power and com-
petitiveness of political participation amongst others. Lastly, we obtain data regarding independence
dates and fractionalization from the Democracy Cross-national Dataset published by the Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University. According to the objective of the paper, we conduct two
sets of analyses, beginning with the effects of CPI on inequality and following on with the effect of
6 Fakir, Ahmed, Hosain, Hossain & Gani (2016)
r − g on inequality, while controlling for corruption.
Even though our compiled data set contains 195 countries, due to lack of regular surveys, data
on each of the variables were not available for the selected time span from 2000 to 2014. Thus the
final regressions are run using a sample of 71 to 78 countries, for the various specifications, depending
on data availability. The countries spanning the analyses are reported in Table A01 in the appendix.
One consequence of this feature is that the panel remains unbalanced. However, in order to keep the
results comparable, the same set of countries was used for each set of specifications, namely the CPI
and r − g specifications. Table 01 provides the summary statistics for the variables.
The wide divergence in our variables of interest illustrates the variation between countries and
their institutional and social frameworks. Glancing at the CPI scores, we can see that the lowest
score was 4 obtained by Bangladesh in 2001 and the highest was 99 obtained by Finland in the same
year. This easily illustrates the great schism between the developing and developed countries within
our panel in their ability to control for corruption. Similarly, we see that the highest inequality being
reached is by Namibia in 2005 with a value of 68 on the Gini Index. On the reverse end, we observe
that Denmark had the lowest recorded level of Gini score of 21 in the 2002. The relationship between
CPI and net Gini is plotted in Figure 1, where we observe a clear negative trend; as CPI scores
increase (as countries get cleaner), inequality generally decreases.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Gini Net 634 35.35749 8.742571 20.64527 68.15549
Income Top 10% 344 28.51212 6.631267 20.14 54.79
CPI 634 53.24448 22.68763 4 99
(r − g) 455 1.899879 9.737268 -50.15018 45.55556
Gross Savings 634 22.26223 6.592869 2.429941 52.68927
Economic Growth Rate 634 3.458533 4.032422 -14.81 33.74
GDP Per Capita 634 23818.39 17570.32 1083.98 96711.05
Inflation 634 4.638013 4.108519 -4.5 32.9
Government Spending as % of GDP 634 17.03226 4.633395 2.8 28.06
Trade Openness 634 86.71208 48.67171 22.14 348.42
Unemployment Rate 634 8.598423 4.937786 0.7 37.6
Population Growth 634 0.771725 0.986311 -2.258464 3.364055
Institutionalized Democracy 634 8.135647 2.737122 0 10
Tax Revenue as % of GDP 634 18.22084 7.531281 0.9054617 61.39911
Year Independence 634 163.123 270.9833 8 1526
Stock Market Capitalisation as % of GDP. 634 51.65962 50.66997 0.37 275.72
Real Interest Rate 523 5.569808 8.573051 -42.31018 48.1918
Although r−g has a low mean of 3.04, it has a very high standard deviation, of almost 22. This is
due to the presence of countries with a combination of either high interest rates combined with nega-
tive growth rates or extremely high growth rates combined with negative interest rates. In addition,
we observe that as with increasing net Gini, r − g increases, as shown in Figure 2, suggesting that,
generally, there exists a positive association between r − g and inequality.
3 Estimation Strategy
In order to investigate the relationship between corruption and inequality we estimate the following
model controlling for determinants of inequality:
Inequality = β0 + β1CPI + β2CPI
2 +
∑14
i=1 βiχi
Corruption, as measured by the CPI is the main variable of interest. A squared term for CPI is
included in order to investigate the possibility of a non-linear relationship with inequality, as previ-
ously explored by Li, Xu & Zou (2000). “χ” represents a vector of variables which includes a variety
of macroeconomic performance controls in addition to cultural and institutional measures.
Comparative Effect of Corruption and r − g on Inequality 7
Fig. 1: Net Gini on CPI
Fig. 2: Net Gini on r-g
Aside, from the standard macroeconomic controls there are a few variables worth delving into. One
of the variables of interest is fractionalization which represents the probability that two individuals
drawn randomly from a population sample are going to come from two different ethnic groups. This
variable is meant to control for social cleavages and its impact on inequality. In addition we control
for years since independence in order to see if more long-lived economies have greater or worse conse-
quences in terms of inequality. Lastly, we also utilize Polity IVs measures of democracy, which allows
us to control for the effect of democratic institutions.
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Due to presence of heteroskedasticity, we employ a Mundlak test as proposed by Mundlak (1978),
in order to determine whether fixed effects or random effects estimation is more appropriate. Because
we obtain a Mundlak statistic of 48.74, rejecting the null hypothesis, we run all of our models using a
fixed effects estimator. In addition, we detect presence of serial correlation within our panel. In order
to correct for this, we utilize robust standard errors for cross-sectional dependence as proposed by
Hoechle (2007). This enables us to correct for first order auto correlation and obtain standard errors
that we can reliably use for inference. However, this does not still correct for the endogeneity present
in the model. As noted by Jong-Sung & Khagram (2005), inequality affects corruption directly. Thus
the model is subject to reverse causality which will bias our estimators if not addressed. In order to
overcome this we utilize an instrument variables approach using 2SLS estimation.
Our chosen instrument variables of choice are government fractionalization, government effec-
tiveness and regulatory quality. We first discuss how the selected instruments satisfy the exclusion
restriction criteria before we present the relevant IV tests and advance with the estimation.
It should be noted that a wide chunk of the available literature uses ELF as an instrument variable
for corruption. However, because greater values of ELF point to greater number of ethnic divisions,
a highly ethnically fractured country is likely to have greater inequality by construction, affecting
inequality directly (and not through corruption). Hence, ELF fails the exclusion restriction condition.
Similarly, Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme (2002) use length of exposure to democracy as an IV.
However, a greater exposure to democracy can inevitably lead to more stable institutions, giving
greater political power to the polity such that they can create policy which reduce inequality directly.
Thus, length of exposure to democracy also fails to uphold the exclusion restriction. In contrast, al-
though distance from the equator(Gillander, 2013) or European Settler Mortality (Acemoglu, Johnson
& Robinson, 2001; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002) do not suffer the same problem, these variables will fail
to work in our fixed effects model due to being time invariant.
We utilize government effectiveness as it measures the perceptions of the quality of government
services (both public and civil) and the ability of the government to execute them independent of
political pressures. The less effective and more bureaucratic government services are, the more in-
centives there exists for individuals to resort to corruption in order to bypass them. In addition,
government bottlenecks create more opportunities for public agents to exercise their power in order
to expropriate rents and other corrupt activities, while individuals have a greater incentive to evade
taxes when government services are less effective.
It should be noted that because our ’government effectiveness’ variable only measures the per-
ceived efficacy of the government as opposed to the actual nature of the government policies, it does
not directly affect redistributive policies such as taxation or spending choices. However, it can be
argued that a more effective government may lead to greater economic performance, which can alter
the distribution of income. In order to diminish the prospects of such factors affecting our model,
we control for several macroeconomic performance indicators such as growth, government spending,
unemployment rate and others.
Regulatory quality measures the quality of the regulations that are meant to govern private in-
dividuals and businesses. The more onerous regulations are, the more bureaucratic and unfriendly
the business environment becomes, necessitating and incentivizing corruption amongst private busi-
nesses. In addition, poorly designed regulations may enable individuals and businesses from hiding
their incomes and evading their taxes, thus furthering corrupt practices. It is important to recognize
that poor regulations may enable more tax evasion which may lead to more inequality. However,
since this effect is occurring through the channel of corruption, it satisfies the exclusion restriction.
Similarly, as for government effectiveness, good regulations may affect inequality through promoting
better economic performance. We once again control for such pathways by including controls for eco-
nomic performance.
Lastly, government fractionalization measures the likelihood that two government employees drawn
at random will be from two different political parties. A higher degree of government fractionalization
will lead to greater degrees of divisions in public offices. This creates more room for bureaucracy and
Comparative Effect of Corruption and r − g on Inequality 9
compromises to be made on a government wide level. This necessitates more corruption in order to
appease various factions within government offices. Moreover, the bureaucratic holdups created by
a more divided public sector create opportunities for corruption in order to bypass them. It may
be argued that a more politically fractionalized government may lead to more policies which favor
specific ethnic groups to whom they owe political allegiance. In order to control for this we include
fractionalization as a control variable in our regression.
In order to investigate the effect of the Second Fundamental Law of Capitalism on inequality, we
include the variable r − g, which simply is the real interest rate minus the rate of economic growth.
Piketty (2014) defines r as the real rate of return and uses the historical rate of around 4-5 percent
for his analysis by allowing growth to vary. In contrast, Acemoglu & Robinson (2015) utilize real in-
terest rates instead which they allow to vary. Given that we are examining a wider range of countries
(including developing countries) in the short run, we are likely to see greater variation in real interest
rates within our panel. Hence, we choose to allow real interest rates to vary in our model. As Piketty
(2014) notes that r encompasses more than just real interest rates and/or corporate profits, and given
it is impossible to estimate accurately a value for such an r, real interest rates can serve as a good
proxy for real returns to capital. When one considers that the vast majority of the nations in our
panel are developing with underdeveloped financial sectors, real interest rates are likely to represent
the best possible available proxy. Following Krusell & Smith’s (2015) argument, we control for gross
savings rate to ensure we can incorporate the effects of differential savings behavior as growth rates
change. This way we can control for how changes in savings affect income from capital and conse-
quently income distribution.
In addition, we wish to look into the effects of how the Second Fundamental Law of Capitalism
affects inequality, dependent on institutional quality. To capture this effect, we interact r − g with
CPI. Given that CPI measures the perception of corruption, it also captures information regarding the
efficacy of institutions. Because countries with better CPI scores (lower values in CPI) have generally
better institutions, this interaction term enables us to examine the role of r-g under various levels of
institutional setting.
4 Results
4.1 Corruption and Inequality
We first present the results for the effects of corruption on inequality before moving to the r−g spec-
ification. Table 2 reports the linear results in columns (1) and (2) and non-linear results in columns
(3) and (4). Note that for each case, we first present the OLS estimation followed by the IV 2SLS
estimation. First stage regressions are reported in table A03 in the appendix.
For both the IV specifications, the Hausman-Wu endogeneity tests reject the null of exogeneity
indicating the presence of endogeneity of corruption with inequality. For the IV estimation with linear
CPI in column (2) we use government fractionalization and government effectiveness as instruments
for CPI; while for the non-linear IV estimation in column (4) we use the lag of regulatory quality
and the square of government effectiveness as instruments for both CPI and CPI2. In the former
case for the linear CPI IV specification where the equation is not exactly identified, with more in-
struments than the single endogenous variable, the Sargan-Hansen J-stat is well over the rejection
threshold accepting the orthogonality condition indicating the validity of the instruments. The Ander-
son under-identification test rejects the null hypothesis well under the 5 per cent threshold indicating
the instruments are correlated with CPI and simple joint significance tests also reject the null hy-
pothesis that time dummies jointly equal zero.
The Wald statistic from the 2SLS weak instrument test are reported in the table under each IV
specification, which are greater than both the Stock-Yogo 10 per cent maximal IV size and 5 per
cent relative bias critical values, indicating that our instruments are strong in both cases. Staiger
and Stock (1998) argue that in the case of weak instruments, the estimations are biased towards the
OLS estimates and can often lead to worse results. Similarly, Stock and Yogo (2005) point out that
although maximum likelihood (ML) estimations are not as affected by weak instruments, they can
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Table 2: OLS & 2SLS Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Linear CPI OLS Linear CPI IV Non-Linear CPI OLS Non-Linear CPI IV
Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect
CPI -0.00259 -0.0976* 0.169*** 0.465*
(0.0136) (0.0589) (0.0333) (0.248)
CPI2 -0.00171*** -0.00476*
(0.000274) (0.00274)
Gross Savings % of GDP 0.0497*** 0.0586*** 0.0377*** 0.00837
(0.0100) (0.0202) (0.0101) (0.0260)
Economic Growth Rate -0.0281 -0.0274 -0.0310 -0.0280
(0.0193) (0.0227) (0.0195) (0.0204)
GDP per Capita 1.44e-05 6.60e-05 2.45e-05 5.21e-05
(7.71e-05) (6.97e-05) (7.68e-05) (6.98e-05)
Inflation -0.0287 -0.0192 -0.0319 0.0182
(0.0242) (0.0284) (0.0249) (0.0272)
Government Spending % of GDP -0.0113 0.0237 -0.0464 -0.150*
(0.0480) (0.0699) (0.0498) (0.0842)
Trade Openness 0.00804 0.00842 0.00611 -0.00734
(0.00871) (0.00824) (0.00868) (0.00838)
Unemployment Rate -0.0170 -0.00401 -0.0165 0.0348
(0.0359) (0.0407) (0.0368) (0.0357)
Population Growth 0.180 0.161 0.187 -0.133
(0.215) (0.238) (0.205) (0.213)
Fractionalization Index 2.625*** 1.208 2.878*** 1.818
(0.705) (1.065) (0.731) (1.119)
Natural Resource Rents % of GDP -0.0953*** -0.106*** -0.0874*** -0.0608**
(0.0173) (0.0221) (0.0166) (0.0277)
Democracy 0.167 0.354 0.146 0.254
(0.170) (0.215) (0.166) (0.203)
Tax Revenue % of GDP -0.0198 -0.0215 -0.0353 -0.0759**
(0.0278) (0.0282) (0.0306) (0.0348)
Years Since Independence 0.187*** 0.0840 0.172*** -0.561
(0.0151) (0.341) (0.0136) (0.381)
Stock Market Capitalization -0.00231 -0.00116 -0.00217 -0.00383
(0.00330) (0.00291) (0.00333) (0.00297)
Observations 634 591 634 544
R-squared 0.045 0.049
Number of country 71 67 71 67
rk Wald F-Stat 31.349 7.158
Stock-Yogo 10% Maximal IV size (19.93) (7.03)
All regressions report panel fixed effects with robust standard errors in parenthesis that are corrected for first order
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, and contain time dummies.
∗∗∗p≺0.01, ∗∗p≺0.05, ∗p≺0.1
produce relatively imprecise estimates. Even though our instruments are relatively strong, we also
report the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates for each of the IV specifications
in Table A02 in the appendix and find our results to be consistent.
It should be noted that the CPI runs from 0-100. On their scale, 0 represents a nation where the
perceptions of corruption are that the country is completely corrupt and 100 represents a country
which is perceived to be perfectly clean. Given, that the Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality, a
reduction in the value of the Gini coefficient represents a movement towards greater equality in the
economy.
We would expect to see CPI have a negative coefficient in our linear specification presented in
column (1), which is indeed the case. A 1 point rise in the CPI will lead to a 0.00259 fall in the value
of the Gini index. However, this result is not significant even at 10 per cent. Given the presence of
endogeneity it is likely this result is subject to substantial bias. With reverse causality present be-
tween inequality and corruption it is not surprising to see an insignificant result using OLS. Using our
instruments however, 2SLS estimation yields a higher significant coefficient. This is a better estimate
as the IV treatment enables us to control for the endogeneity.
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Based on the linear IV model in column (2), we can see that a rise in CPI of 1 point will lead to a
fall in inequality by 0.0976 on the Gini coefficient. Put in concrete terms, if the CPI deteriorates by 10
points in a year, the Gini coefficient will rise by 0.976 in that same period. To put it into comparison,
within the same model, a 10 per cent rise in unemployment causes a smaller rise in inequality. This
suggests that corruption is one of the larger driving forces behind inequality even after controlling
for taxation and other macroeconomic factors.
We can speculate regarding the channels through which corruption increases inequality with some
degree of accuracy. We posit that tax evasion by wealthy individuals can lead to tax structures becom-
ing effectively regressive. In addition, corruption enables wealthy individuals to avoid fully declaring
their assets. This is not only prevalent within developing nations but is a global phenomenon as
highlighted by the recent Panama papers leak. Furthermore, corruption hampers the effectiveness of
redistribution policies by reducing the quality of government services such as education or health care.
However, using the above model allows us only to examine the effects of corruption on inequality.
Given that countries have substantial variation in corruption over time and between themselves, it is
necessary to test the non-linear variation in corruption. Granted that corruption is unlikely to be fully
eradicated in most countries, at what level does corruption cease to be a major obstacle to equality
is also of interest.
The inclusion of corruption squared, reported in column (3), turns the linear corruption term
significant which was not the case in the solely linear model without the use of instrument variables.
Utilizing IVs for the non-linear specification, reported in column (4), causes the coefficients on both
terms to rise and remain significant. The results from the non-linear IV model tell us that below a CPI
score of 48.8, inequality will continue to rise due to the effects of corruption. Above that, a country is
sufficiently clean for inequality to diminish. A similar trend has also been noted by Li, Xu Zou (2000).
In concrete terms, in order for Bangladesh to no longer face rising inequality due to corruption,
Bangladesh (which has a latest CPI score of 26) would have to reduce its corruption to the level
of the Czech Republic (CPI score of 51). For a lot of corrupt nations this represents a massive
decrease in corruption, far greater than what they have achieved over the period of study. The scale
of improvements to legal institutions, regulatory bodies and social values necessary is immense. Such
changes require long term reforms to be made in order to have the necessary impacts. Given short
election cycles and vested interests of governments, such reforms may be unlikely or unsuccessful in
short periods of time. However, the implementations of such reforms are ultimately highly desirable
as it can lead to more egalitarian societies in the long run.
4.2 r-g Hypothesis
It should be noted that Piketty (2014) prescribed his second fundamental law of capitalism as a long
run phenomenon whereas we are testing the relationship in a short run of about 15 years. While we
do re-run the same regression using 3-year averages to find consistency of our results, a study with
a longer time frame would prove to be a better robustness check. The major limitation to this is the
availability of data for such a long time frame, especially for developing countries. However, despite
this, there is some valuable insight to be gained from such an exercise.
Acemoglu & Robinson (2015) find that the r− g hypothesis is a poor explanatory variable for the
sustained rise in inequality over the past century. They argue that institutions play a far more crucial
role in shaping the income distribution of societies than the second law. Institutions are relatively
stable in the short run and only evolve over the long run. Thus, by focusing on the short run, we can
minimize the role that institutional changes play in shaping inequality and focus more on the causal
relationship between r− g and inequality. Moreover, developing nations have far higher interest rates
as a consequence of a legacy of high inflation, meaning that they have substantially higher values of
r− g. This may lead to inequality rising even in the short run due to r− g as a consequence. Results
are provided in table 3 in a similar pattern as table 2. Columns (1) and (2) reports r− g in presence
of CPI and CPI2 and columns (3) and (4) include the interaction of r − g with CPI building on the
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previous specification. As in table 2, OLS results are reported first, followed by its IV 2SLS estimation
in the next column. First stage regressions are reported in table A03 in the appendix.
Table 3: OLS & 2SLS Regression Result of r-g Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Linear CPI OLS Linear CPI IV Non-Linear CPI OLS Non-Linear CPI IV
Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect
with (r-g)×CPI with (r-g)×CPI
CPI 0.145** 0.256* 0.156** 0.298**
(0.0544) (0.139) (0.0554) (0.139)
CPI2 -0.00163*** -0.00204 -0.00173*** -0.00249*
(0.000515) (0.00144) (0.000544) (0.00143)
(r − g) 0.0179 0.0260** 0.0494* 0.0623**
(0.0100) (0.0114) (0.0242) (0.0258)
(r − g)× CPI -0.000737 -0.000947
(0.000570) (0.000677)
Gross Savings as % of GDP 0.0196* 0.0205 0.0229** 0.0235
(0.00920) (0.0217) (0.00932) (0.0216)
GDP per capita 0.000298*** 0.000222** 0.000282*** 0.000211**
(7.33e-05) (9.97e-05) (6.77e-05) (0.000102)
Inflation -0.0189 0.0245 -0.0132 0.0303*
(0.0278) (0.0181) (0.0253) (0.0178)
Government Spending as % of GDP -0.111 -0.203*** -0.112 -0.209***
(0.0910) (0.0731) (0.0914) (0.0729)
Trade Openness 0.00366 -0.0149 0.00264 -0.0171
(0.00951) (0.0112) (0.00940) (0.0116)
Unemployment Rate 0.0339 0.0743 0.0375 0.0808
(0.0422) (0.0495) (0.0411) (0.0510)
Population Growth 0.613** 0.227 0.646** 0.284
(0.236) (0.280) (0.247) (0.285)
Fractionalization Index 1.272 0.870 1.350 1.001
(0.814) (1.001) (0.851) (1.013)
Natural Resource Rent as % of GDP -0.0763*** -0.0583** -0.0772*** -0.0579**
(0.0157) (0.0252) (0.0156) (0.0259)
Tax Revenue as % of GDP 0.00940 -0.0191 0.00900 -0.0183
(0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0164) (0.0178)
Years Since Independence 0.252*** -0.661 0.252*** -0.632
(0.0305) (0.526) (0.0309) (0.536)
Observations 569 477 569 477
R-squared 0.112 0.104
Number of country 78 69 78 69
rk Wald F-Stat 30.494 21.142
Stock-Yogo 10% Maximal IV size (7.03) (not available)
All regressions report panel fixed effects with robust standard errors in parenthesis that are corrected for first order
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, and contain time dummies.
∗∗∗p≺0.01, ∗∗p≺0.05, ∗p≺0.1
Similar to the non-linear IV specification from table 2, we use the lag of regulatory quality and
the square of government effectiveness as instruments for both CPI and CPI2 for the IV model with
r − g only in column (2). The two prove to be robust instruments with a Wald statistic from the
2SLS weak instrument test greater than both the Stock-Yogo 10 per cent maximal IV size and 5 per
cent relative bias critical values. For the specification including the interaction of r − g with CPI, in
addition to using the earlier two instruments, lag of regulatory quality and the square of government
effectiveness for instrumenting CPI and CPI2, we also use the interaction of r − g with regulatory
quality as an instrument for interaction of r − g with CPI. This yields a Wald statistic of 20.142.
Unfortunately, the Stock-Yogo critical values are not available for three endogenous regressors,
however the high Wald statistic deems the instruments to be relatively strong. As a consistency check
however, we again report the LIML estimates for both the IV specifications in the appendix in table
A02 and find our results to be consistent. We find the Hausman-Wu endogeneity test reject the null
of exogeneity and Anderson under-identification test to indicate the instruments to be well correlated
with CPI. Simple joint significance tests also reject the null hypothesis that time dummies jointly
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equal zero.
Corruption continues to be significant and exhibit a nonlinear effect on inequality even after con-
trolling for r − g. Corruption and its squared term even display roughly consistent turning points in
each specification. However, it should be noted that in the non-linear instrument variable specification
in column (2), corruption squared is not significant even though both are jointly significant.
We find that r− g is significant in pretty much every specification with the exception of the OLS
model in column (1). This may be due to the endogeneity causing bias in the estimators. However,
once we use instrument variables within the model, we find that r-g is a significant determinant of
inequality even after controlling for the non-linear effects of corruption.
These findings are consistent within the rest of our specifications suggesting that r− g does have
a significant effect on inequality. However, it should be noted that the magnitude of the effect is quite
small in comparison to the effects of government spending or population growth. This indicates that
although r−g has a significant effect, it is far from being the main determinant of inequality in society.
It is interesting to note that during high levels of pre-existing corruption, corruption drives inequality
up far more than r− g, almost as a positive feedback. This suggests that institutional failures play a
more important role than the dynamics of capitalism itself. Although, this does suggest that Piketty’s
theory has empirical merit, our findings suggest that the institutional analysis offered by Acemoglu
& Robinson (2015) is more compelling even in the short run.
To further examine the role of institutions, we interact corruption with r − g. Given that the
CPI scores reflect perceptions of corruption, they capture the efficacy of institutions in a nation at a
given period of time. Gerring & Thacker (2004) note that corruption and institutions are inextricably
linked with vast majority of empirical studies finding that corruption has a very high correlation
with institutional variables. Similarly, our data shows that CPI to be very highly correlated with
government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law.
The inclusion of the interaction term increases the significance of both corruption and r−g whilst
causing their coefficients to rise. However, the interaction term itself is not significant within both the
IV and non-IV models, although a joint significance test reveals that the interaction term along with
corruption and r-g is jointly significant. Furthermore, differentiating with respect to r−g reveals that
r − g increases inequality for virtually all values of the CPI.
This once again suggests that dysfunctional institutional systems are far more responsible for
inequality than the r − g phenomenon, at least in our 15-year time scale. Our findings illustrate the
fact that even though the returns on capital have exceeded growth rates, it is the failure to create
effective institutions to redistribute the wealth that is the true culprit. The main impediment, we
find, is corruption which is a key determinant of inequality in all our specifications.
4.3 Quantile Regressions
Having exhibited the basic relationship of CPI and r−g with inequality, it is then of interest to further
explore how the effects vary with degrees of inequality. We use Chernozhukov and Hansens (2008)
ivqreg command in Stata compiled by Kwak (2010) to run instrument variables quantile regressions
in order to further explore this. Having previously established the non-linearity of corruption with
inequality and that r− g increases inequality for almost all levels of corruption, we explore the linear
relationships of the variables with inequality. We use the same instruments as reported earlier. Results
are presented in table 4.
Barring the 30th quartile it is apparent that the effects of CPI decrease with greater inequal-
ity. This suggests that in societies which are already highly unequal, increases in CPI score reduces
inequality by a smaller amount, or conversely, additional corruption generates lesser inequality, com-
pared to more egalitarian countries. To be precise, for a country in the 80th quantile of inequality,
one unit increase in CPI score would reduce inequality by 0.0761 compared to a reduction of 0.168
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for a country in the 10th quantile of inequality. In other words, for highly unequal countries, there
are factors other than corruption driving inequality that needs to be addressed. Simply considering
the other covariates, we can see that greater government spending as a percentage of GDP and lower
unemployment rate has a much larger influence in reducing inequality than corruption, compared to
that in more equal countries. In more equal countries, where these factors have a lower influence, the
effect of a reduction in corruption is seen to be greater.
In addition, we see a clear downward trend of r− g with increasing quantiles of inequality. At the
20th quantile, r−g is significant and has a coefficient of 0.234 whereas it diminishes to 0.128 by the
time we climb to the 70th quantile. This suggests that at high levels of inequality, r− g has a smaller
effect on inequality. Figure 3 illustrates the difference between quantile results and comparable OLS
estimation for the effect of r− g on inequality. We set the quantile increment to 0.005 for the graphs
where the solid line are the quantile estimates, the dashed line is the OLS estimate and the dotted
lines represent the 95 per cent OLS confidence interval. Note that the 0.5 quantile regression estimate
would only equal the OLS estimate if the conditional (on covariates) distribution of inequality is
symmetric (such that the conditional mean and conditional median are the same).
Fig. 3: Quantile regression estimates of r-g on inequality
Figure 3 clearly discerns a falling effect of r− g on inequality. Despite some degree of irregularity
and fluxes across the quantiles, this shows us a richer picture than an OLS average. This suggests that
in the most highly unequal societies, other institutional factors play a role than the pure dynamics
of capitalism itself. In all likelihood, in order for inequality to reach such high levels, either requires
systemic negligence on the part of governments towards dealing with inequality or strong moral codes
which justify inequality. The nature of taxation systems and the ability of individuals to affect them
through de-jure political power is highlighted in Acemoglu & Robison (2015) as being a key variable
in determining inequality.
In addition one must also consider the role of technological change behind inequality. By changing
the demand for various skills, technological change has altered income distributions radically, while
changing compensation structures in financial and IT sectors have also contributed to high levels
of inequality. Thus examining inequality in highly unequal societies ideally requires examination of
sector-wise analysis where we control for the growth of financial and IT sectors. Although data limi-
tations for this persist, this will allow a more nuanced look at the causes of inequality and can be a
subject of further examination.
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5 Limitations
Our primary method of measuring our dependent variable is through the use of standardized Gini
coefficients. Gini coefficients are ultimately a synthetic measure of inequality in the sense that they
do not offer a structural look at how inequality evolves over time. In that respect Gini coefficients are
a poor measure. However, given that majority of nations within our panel do not have well reported
top 10 per cent income shares consistently, utilizing Gini coefficients gives us the greatest possible
coverage and comparability. However, for a deeper understanding, we check our results utilizing 10
per cent income share data with a smaller pool of countries. Results are reported in table 5.
Table 5: Regression Results of Top 10 per cent Income Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Linear CPI IV Non-Linear CPI IV Non-Linear CPI IV Non-Linear CPI
with (r-g)×CPI
Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect
CPI -0.00185 -0.625* -0.613* -0.659*
(0.0572) (0.367) (0.338) (0.373)
CPI2 0.00637* 0.00587* 0.00632*
(0.00358) (0.00345) (0.00361)
(r − g) 0.0177 -0.0197
(0.0200) (0.111)
(r − g)× CPI 0.000860
(0.00235)
Gross Savings Rate -0.000622 0.0247 0.0265 0.0225
(0.0398) (0.0519) (0.0589) (0.0587)
GDP per Capita -3.72e-05 -4.43e-06 7.11e-05 8.84e-05
(0.000111) (0.000124) (0.000247) (0.000267)
Inflation 0.0329 0.121** 0.109* 0.104
(0.0558) (0.0516) (0.0610) (0.0670)
Gov. Spending as share of GDP 0.101 0.271* 0.201 0.200
(0.0921) (0.140) (0.127) (0.128)
Trade Openness 0.0137 0.0189 0.0168 0.0189
(0.0105) (0.0141) (0.0193) (0.0217)
Unemployment Rate -0.0268 -0.0189 0.0366 0.0346
(0.0413) (0.0493) (0.0788) (0.0787)
Population Growth -0.0399 -0.329 -0.306 -0.356
(0.352) (0.361) (0.505) (0.519)
Fractionalization Index -3.544* -4.387 -5.756* -6.082*
(1.934) (2.711) (3.076) (3.452)
Natural Resource Rents as % of GDP 0.0925 0.186* 0.214** 0.210**
(0.0833) (0.0966) (0.0985) (0.0997)
Institutionalized Democracy 0.0197** 0.0329** 0.0528 0.0704
(0.00891) (0.0141) (0.329) (0.336)
Tax Revenue as % of GDP -0.0396 0.0242 0.0928 0.102
(0.0293) (0.0524) (0.0972) (0.107)
Years Since Independence 1.038** 1.766*** 1.846** 1.842**
(0.451) (0.659) (0.853) (0.859)
Stock Market Capitalization as % of GDP 9.97e-06 -0.000624 0.00268 0.00291
(0.00382) (0.00515) (0.00820) (0.00842)
Observations 326 304 209 209
R-squared 0.1 0.044 0.057 0.037
Number of country 56 56 43 43
rk Wald F-Stat 32.474 8.531 11.775 8.447
Stock-Yogo 10% Maximal IV size (19.93) (7.03) (7.03) (not known)
All regressions report panel fixed effects, robust standard errors in parenthesis are corrected for first order serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity and contain time dummies. ∗ ∗ ∗p ≺ 0.01, ∗∗p ≺ 0.05, ∗p ≺ 0.1
We find that corruption still remains a significant determinant of inequality. However, the non-
linear relationship is now different from the Gini coefficient model. It shows that as corruption declines,
inequality initially declines. After the CPI score passes 49, income share to the top 10 per cent starts
increasing. This is in stark contrast to the findings when utilizing Gini coefficients suggesting that
corruption affects top 10 per cent income shares differently than broader inequality. As Acemoglu &
Robinson (2015) also note in their case study of South Africa, viewing decile income shares gave a
vastly different view of inequality than viewing Gini coefficients. They find that whist using decile
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shares, post-Apartheid South Africa had declining inequality which contradicted anecdotal evidence.
In contrast, Gini coefficients showed the opposite effect and consequently the truer representation of
the evolution of inequality. Given that a similar effect is observed here, we would argue that Gini
provides a better reflection of the evolution of inequality over time. However, it should be noted that
corruption does significantly affect inequality in either specification.
When utilizing top 10 per cent income shares, r− g fails to be significant. This is consistent with
the findings of Acemoglu & Robinson (2015) who find that r− g fails to significantly explain changes
in top 10 per cent income shares. However, given that we find r − g to increase inequality when
utilizing the Gini coefficient, this presents us with an interesting paradox. It may be that r − g does
not significantly increase the top 10 per cent income shares in the short run, but increases inequality
by increasing the income going to other groups in society.
Another issue we faced was that of a lack of appropriate time series data for secondary education
completion. Given that nations publish such data as part of their population census, we only had
3 time periods of data, on average, for the nations in our sample within our time period. To check
for robustness, we took 3 year averages of our data and ran our primary regression with the level of
secondary education as a control. The results are reported in table A04 in the appendix. The inclusion
of secondary education did not change our results substantially and was itself insignificant.
6 Discussion
As we see from our quantile regressions, r−g loses its significance at higher levels of inequality where
institutional effects primarily dominate. In contrast, corruption continues to have significant explana-
tory power over inequality even at high levels of inequality. Given that corruption can be interpreted
as the failure of institutions the two conclusions can be seen to be mutually reinforcing.
One interpretation of this may be that the returns to capital are not very problematic with regards
to inequality. This may lead to the conclusion that high taxes on capital returns are not necessary.
However, as we find that at intermediate levels of inequality, r − g does increase inequality signifi-
cantly. A consequence of this is, as long as r is greater than g, the owners of capital enjoy higher
incomes than the rest of society, which they may choose to re-invest and obtain more capital. This
short term dynamic can lead to substantial wealth inequality in the long run as capital gets highly
concentrated in the hands of pre-existing capital owners. Piketty (2015) demonstrates this by showing
that capital holders can increase their holding of capital by reinvesting gr of their income. Hence, for
such cases, policy needs to be taken in order to redistribute income from capital.
However, higher taxes on capital are always politically very difficult to implement due to various
factors. In contrast, it may be far easier to reach political agreement to fight corruption. Although
there exists political consensus to fight corruption, efforts have largely failed in the vast majority of
developing countries. In our panel, the vast majority of developing countries showed only slight im-
provements in their CPI scores. For instance, Bangladesh improved its score from 20 to 25 in between
2007 and 2014. Similarly, Gabon had a CPI score of 33 in 2004 and improved only to 37 by 2014. The
failure to see any drastic improvements in CPI in most developing countries illustrates how embedded
corruption has become.
Even though political consensus exists, changes in laws are often bypassed or out-thought by
corrupt entities. This reluctance to reduce corrupt behavior can be down to how much corruption is
ingrained into the psyche and culture of some nations. Hence, despite changes in legislature, no real
reductions in corruption are perceived. In addition, vested interests may prevent legal systems and
anti-corruption watch-dogs from properly functioning. A combination of these factors explains why
corruption is so difficult to combat in a lot of countries. Given that reductions in corruption can drive
down inequality, this is a missed opportunity for developing nations to reap the benefits of a more
egalitarian society.
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7 Conclusions
We find that corruption is a significant driving force behind inequality in all of our specifications.
Most pertinently, by examining the non-linear specification of our model, we are able to establish a
clear threshold at which corruption ceases to cause rising inequality. At a CPI scores higher than 48,
reductions in corruption reduce inequality substantially. This suggests that driving down corruption
should be an aim of policymakers concerned with combating rising inequality. However, given that the
majority of developing countries have CPI scores substantially lower than that, such improvements in
institutions may be out of reach within the short term for the vast majority of developing countries
within our sample. Additionally, we find that the effects of corruption are lower with higher levels of
inequality by examining our quantile model.
In comparison, even though we find r−g to be significant in the vast majority of our specifications,
the magnitude of the effect on inequality is quite small, at least in the 15-year period considered.
Although the effects in the short run may be small, such changes could accumulate over the long run
to contribute to substantial rises in inequality if unchecked. It should be noted we find no evidence
that r− g has any effect in the most highly unequal societies. We conclude that in such cases institu-
tional factors play a larger role. In addition, we discover no evidence of substantial interaction effect
between r − g and corruption on inequality.
Based on the evidence at hand, it is apparent that institutional quality is a far more important
determinant of inequality in the short run. Given the high correlation between corruption and the
efficacy of institutions, reducing corruption would be an effective policy tool that should be utilized
foremost by policy makers intending to combat inequality.
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Appendix
Table A1: Country List
Albania Cyprus Iceland Morocco Slovenia
Armenia Czech Republic India Namibia South Africa
Australia Denmark Indonesia Nepal Spain
Bangladesh Dominican Republic Ireland New Zealand Sri Lanka
Barbados Egypt Israel Nicaragua Sweden
Belgium Estonia Italy Nigeria Switzerland
Bhutan Fiji Jamaica Norway Tanzania
Bolivia Finland Jordan Panama Thailand
Bosnia and Herzegovina France Kenya Paraguay Trinidad and Tobago
Brazil Gambia Laos Peru USA
Bulgaria Georgia Latvia Poland Uganda
Canada Germany Lithuania Romania Ukraine
Chile Greece Madagascar Russia Uruguay
Colombia Guatemala Malaysia Rwanda Zambia
Costa Rica Honduras Malta Sierra Leone
Croatia Hungary Moldova Slovakia
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Table A2: LIML Regression
VARIABLES Linear CPI Non-Linear CPI Non-Linear Non-Linear
with (r − g) with (r − g)× CPI
CPI -0.102 0.465* 0.256* 0.298**
(0.0621) (0.248) (0.139) (0.139)
CPI2 -0.00476* -0.00204 -0.00249*
(0.00274) (0.00144) (0.00143)
(r − g) 0.0260** 0.0623**
(0.0114) (0.0258)
(r − g)× CPI -0.000947
(0.000677)
Economic Growth Rate -0.0276 -0.0280
(0.0228) (0.0204)
GDP Per Capita 6.82e-05 5.21e-05 0.000222** 0.000211**
(7.06e-05) (6.98e-05) (9.97e-05) (0.000102)
Inflation -0.0195 0.0182 0.0245 0.0303*
(0.0286) (0.0272) (0.0181) (0.0178)
Govt. Spending as % of GDP 0.0255 -0.150* -0.203*** -0.209***
(0.0705) (0.0842) (0.0731) (0.0729)
Trade Openness 0.00862 -0.00734 -0.0149 -0.0171
(0.00831) (0.00838) (0.0112) (0.0116)
Unemployment Rate -0.00443 0.0348 0.0743 0.0808
(0.0409) (0.0357) (0.0495) (0.0510)
Population Growth 0.161 -0.133 0.227 0.284
(0.239) (0.213) (0.280) (0.285)
Fractionalisation Index 1.169 1.818 0.870 1.001
(1.077) (1.119) (1.001) (1.013)
Natural Resources as % of GDP -0.107*** -0.0608** -0.0583** -0.0579**
(0.0223) (0.0277) (0.0252) (0.0259)
Institutionalized Democracy 0.356* 0.254
(0.216) (0.203)
Tax Revenue as % of GDP -0.0212 -0.0759** -0.0191 -0.0183
(0.0285) (0.0348) (0.0174) (0.0178)
Year Since Independence 0.0930 -0.561 -0.661 -0.632
(0.344) (0.381) (0.526) (0.536)
Stock Market Capitalisation as % of GDP -0.00115 -0.00383
(0.00291) (0.00297)
Observations 591 544 477 477
Number of country 67 67 69 69
rk Wald F-Stat 31.349 7.158 30.494 21.142
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p ≺ 0.01, ∗∗p ≺ 0.05, ∗p ≺ 0.1
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Table A4: Regression with Education
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Non-Linear Non-Linear Non-Linear
CPI Model CPI with (r − g) with (r − g)× CPI
CPI 0.259** 0.212* 0.300**
(0.104) (0.115) (0.113)
CPI2 -0.00247*** -0.00208* -0.00262**
(0.000829) (0.00112) (0.00108)
(r − g) 0.0331 0.370***
(0.0614) (0.134)
(r − g)× CPI -0.00615***
(0.00176)
Gross Savings 0.220** 0.215** 0.274***
(0.0874) (0.0939) (0.0838)
Growth Rate -0.0893 0.0339 0.160
(0.0829) (0.157) (0.165)
GDP Per Capita -4.43e-05 -1.89e-05 -0.000164
(0.000142) (0.000148) (0.000146)
Inflation -0.0675 -0.119* -0.0975*
(0.0632) (0.0650) (0.0573)
Government Spendings as % of GDP 0.170 -0.271 -0.182
(0.222) (0.250) (0.216)
Trade Openness 0.0132 0.0100 0.0133
(0.0172) (0.0190) (0.0188)
Level of Secondary Education 0.00440 0.00970 -0.000432
(0.0280) (0.0273) (0.0225)
Unemployment Rate -0.142* -0.172** -0.134*
(0.0847) (0.0814) (0.0768)
Population Growth 0.665 1.152 1.457**
(0.625) (0.737) (0.667)
Fractionalization Index 6.441*** 3.079 4.337***
(2.301) (1.918) (1.504)
Natural Resource as % of GDP -0.184*** -0.129** -0.102*
(0.0613) (0.0626) (0.0586)
Institutionalized Democracy -0.0334 -0.128*** -0.135***
(0.0602) (0.0276) (0.0270)
Tax Revenue as % of GDP -0.200** -0.236** -0.269***
(0.0759) (0.105) (0.0962)
Year Since Independence -0.00622 0.00229 0.117
(0.0920) (0.105) (0.102)
Stock Market Capitalization as % of GDP 0.00148 -0.00239 0.00296
(0.0111) (0.0116) (0.0114)
Observations 174 137 137
Number of country 70 61 61
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p ≺ 0.01, ∗∗p ≺ 0.05, ∗p ≺ 0.1
Figure 01 Click here to download Figure Fig. 1 Net Gini on CPI.png 
Figure 02 Click here to download Figure Fig. 2 Net Gini on r-g.png 
Figure 03 Click here to download Figure Fig. 3 Quantile regression estimates of r-g on
inequality.png
